Treadstone Associates
Case File · Foreign Investment Review

The investment had been implemented for eight months when the Governor in Council ordered the buyer to divest

Anonymised, illustrative composite. Eight months after closing and well into integration, a Governor in Council order under Investment Canada Act s.25.4 required the buyer to divest control of a business it had already made its own — the terminal remedy in Part IV.1, reaching a deal everyone believed was long since finished.

Treadstone Associates · Updated 2026

At a glance

  • • A foreign buyer completed the acquisition of a New Brunswick rare-earth-materials processor eight months before a Governor in Council order required it to divest control.
  • • Investment Canada Act s.25.4(1) lets the Governor in Council take any measures “that he or she considers advisable” on a referred investment, including “requiring the non-Canadian to divest themselves of control of the Canadian business” — on a completed, integrated investment, not only a pending one.
  • • s.25.4(3) makes compliance mandatory: the buyer had no discretion to negotiate the order away once it issued.
  • • No Competition Act remedy in this cluster reaches an already-closed, already-integrated business on national-security grounds — this is Part IV.1's terminal, post-closing power.
  • • The buyer had spent five months integrating the target's ERP systems, supply contracts and workforce into its own operations before the order arrived — the unwind cost far exceeded anything the original deal diligence had modelled.

The situation

A foreign buyer completed its acquisition of a New Brunswick processor of rare-earth materials used in magnet manufacturing. The deal had cleared an earlier, narrower government inquiry without an order being made, and the buyer proceeded to integrate the business over the following months — consolidating back-office systems, renegotiating supply agreements under its own group terms, and folding the target's workforce into its broader North American operating structure. Eight months after closing, a new government review — opened on facts that had changed since the original clearance, including a shift in the target's customer concentration toward defence-adjacent buyers — resulted in a Governor in Council order directing the buyer to divest control.

The problem

The buyer's first reaction was that a completed, integrated acquisition should be different in kind from a pending one — that whatever remedies existed for a deal still in progress could not reach a transaction that had already closed and been folded into the buyer's own operations for the better part of a year. The Act does not draw that line.

The numbers

The target had annual revenue of $54,000,000 at closing and had grown to $61,000,000 under the buyer's ownership by the time the order issued. Unwinding eight months of ERP and supply-chain integration was independently estimated at $4,200,000 in direct separation costs, before any consideration of what a forced-sale process does to achievable value.

The rule that decided it

Read the unit. Section 25.4(1) engages “on the referral of an investment under paragraph 25.3(6)(a) or subsection 25.3(7)”, and once it engages the Governor in Council “may, by order, within the prescribed period, take any measures in respect of the investment that he or she considers advisable to protect national security”, including “(a) directing the non-Canadian not to implement the investment; (b) authorizing the non-Canadian to make the investment on the terms and conditions contained in the order; or (c) requiring the non-Canadian to divest themselves of control of the Canadian business or of their investment in the entity”. Nothing in that list, or in the section as a whole, is worded as available only before implementation. Paragraph (a) plainly presupposes a deal not yet implemented; paragraph (c) — divestiture of control already acquired — presupposes the opposite. The remedy is built for exactly the situation this file describes.

Once the order issues, it is not a negotiating position. Section 25.4(3) states plainly that “the non-Canadian or other person or entity to which the order is directed shall comply with the order”. No conditional language, no discretion for the recipient. And like the interim-conditions order addressed elsewhere in this cluster, the order itself does not go through the ordinary channel: s.25.4(4) disapplies the Statutory Instruments Act to it as well.

The outcome

The buyer ran a structured sale process under a divestiture timeline set by the order, ultimately selling the business to a Canadian-controlled purchaser at a price below what an unconstrained sale process would likely have achieved — the forced timeline and the narrowed universe of eligible buyers both worked against value. The buyer's own integration spend over the intervening eight months was, in substance, a sunk cost with no offsetting return.

What it would have cost otherwise

Non-compliance was never seriously on the table once counsel confirmed the order's scope, because failing to comply with a s.25.4 order is itself a distinct enforcement ground under s.39(1)(d.2) — a Ministerial demand can issue against a non-Canadian who “has failed to comply with an order made under section 25.3 or 25.4”, layered on top of whatever consequence non-compliance with the underlying divestiture order carried on its own.

The tell

The tell was treating an earlier, uneventful government inquiry as a permanent clearance rather than a snapshot. National security review under Part IV.1 is not exhausted by one clean pass — a later shift in the target's customer base or operations can put a completed, integrated investment back in scope, and s.25.4's remedies reach it there just as fully as they would have reached it before closing.

Takeaways

  • • s.25.4(1)'s divestiture power is available against a completed, already-integrated investment — it is the terminal remedy in Part IV.1, and closing does not put a deal permanently beyond its reach.
  • • Compliance with a s.25.4 order is mandatory under s.25.4(3); non-compliance is separately enforceable under s.39(1)(d.2).
  • • No remedy addressed elsewhere in this cluster reaches an already-closed, already-integrated business on national security grounds the way s.25.4 does.
  • • An early clearance is a snapshot, not a permanent status — a material change in the target's operations or customer base after closing can reopen exposure under Part IV.1.

Sources

  • • Investment Canada Act s.25.4 — marginal note Governor in Council's powers: s.25.4(1) the available measures including divestiture; s.25.4(3) marginal note Requirement to comply with order; s.25.4(4) marginal note Statutory Instruments Act does not apply.
  • • s.39(1)(d.2) — marginal note Ministerial demand: enforcement of non-compliance with a s.25.4 order.
  • • Treadstone Law — common post-closing disputes on an Ontario business sale — adjacent: it addresses ordinary contractual post-closing disputes between buyer and seller, not a government-ordered post-closing divestiture on national security grounds. The provisions above are the operative rule for this mechanic.

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