Treadstone Associates
Case File · Acquisition Debt

An interest deduction the excessive interest rules capped

Anonymised, illustrative composite. Nothing about the debt changed. What changed was that the third bolt-on pushed the group's taxable capital past a threshold, and a limitation the model had never carried denied 28.5% of the interest deduction.

Treadstone Associates · Updated 2026

At a glance

  • • Canadian platform group, three acquisitions in twenty-eight months, senior and mezzanine acquisition debt across the group.
  • • ITA s.18.2(2) denies a proportion of a taxpayer's interest and financing expenses, operating “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act” and applying to every taxpayer “(other than an excluded entity for the year)”.
  • • Interest and financing expenses $3,400,000; adjusted taxable income $7,600,000; ratio of permissible expenses 30%; interest and financing revenues $150,000.
  • • Denied proportion (3,400,000 − (2,280,000 + 150,000)) ÷ 3,400,000 = 28.53%, or $970,000 of deduction.
  • • All three excluded-entity branches failed: group taxable capital above $50,000,000, group net interest and financing expenses above $1,000,000, and a 26% non-resident co-investor.

The situation

A Canadian buy-and-build platform in industrial services had made three acquisitions in a little over two years, funded with a senior facility at the platform and a mezzanine tranche for the third deal. The model behind the third acquisition price deducted every dollar of interest, as the first two had, and the group's tax provision had never carried a limitation line. Nothing about the debt changed in the year the limitation applied — the group's size and the composition of its equity did.

The problem

The excessive interest and financing expenses limitation does not apply to every taxpayer. It applies to a taxpayer that is not an excluded entity for the year, and excluded-entity status is tested annually and at group level. A group can therefore be outside the rules for two years and inside them in the third without renegotiating a single credit agreement — which is what happened here.

Two things moved. The third acquisition took the associated group's taxable capital employed in Canada past $50,000,000, and a co-investor resident outside Canada, brought into the equity for the third deal, took 26% of the platform. Each of those closes a different branch of the excluded-entity definition, and the definition is disjunctive: the group needed only one branch and now had none.

The numbers

For the year in question: interest and financing expenses of $3,400,000; adjusted taxable income of $7,600,000; interest and financing revenues of $150,000; no received or absorbed capacity.

The permissible amount is the ratio of permissible expenses multiplied by adjusted taxable income — 30% of $7,600,000, or $2,280,000. Adding the $150,000 of interest and financing revenues gives $2,430,000. The denied proportion is therefore ($3,400,000 − $2,430,000) ÷ $3,400,000 = 28.53%, applied to the amounts otherwise deductible, denying $970,000 of the $3,400,000.

On the excluded-entity tests, the group's net figure — interest and financing expenses of $3,400,000 less interest and financing revenues of $150,000, aggregated across the Canadian group — was $3,250,000, against a threshold of $1,000,000.

The rule that decided it

ITA s.18.2(2) carries the marginal note Excessive interest and financing expenses limitation. It opens “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act” and provides that in computing the income of a taxpayer “(other than an excluded entity for the year)” from a business or property, or its taxable income, no deduction shall be made in respect of interest and financing expenses that would otherwise be deductible “to the extent of the proportion of that amount that is determined by the formula (A − (B + C + D + E)) ÷ F”.

The unit is a proportion of the taxpayer's interest and financing expenses, not a cap on a loan. Nothing is disallowed because a particular facility is too large. A percentage is computed from group-level and entity-level inputs and applied to the expenses that would otherwise be deducted. Two consequences follow that a covenant-style reading misses: the denial moves with earnings, so a bad year worsens it; and interest and financing revenues (the letter C) reduce it, so intercompany interest income is not neutral.

B, in the ordinary case, is the ratio of permissible expenses multiplied by adjusted taxable income. The ratio is defined in s.18.2(1): for a taxation year beginning on or after October 1, 2023 and before January 1, 2024 it is 40%, and “if the taxpayer's taxation year begins on or after January 1, 2024” it is 30%. It is a percentage of earnings, not of debt, which is why a leverage model built on a debt-to-EBITDA covenant does not capture it.

Everything therefore turns on excluded-entity status, defined in s.18.2(1) in three disjunctive branches. Branch (a) covers “a corporation that is throughout the particular year a Canadian-controlled private corporation in respect of which the amount determined for C in paragraph 125(5.1)(a) for the year is less than $50,000,000” — and that amount is, per s.125(5.1)(a), taxable capital employed in Canada, aggregated across associated corporations. Branch (b) is a de minimis: it applies where “$1,000,000 is not less than” the group's net interest and financing expenses, computed across the taxpayer and its Canadian eligible group entities.

Branch (c) is the all-Canadian branch, and it is the one the co-investor closed. It requires, among other conditions, that all or substantially all of the businesses and activities of the taxpayer and each eligible group entity be carried on in Canada, a foreign-affiliate exposure of not more than $5,000,000, and — at subparagraph (c)(iii) — that no person or partnership is at any time in the year “a specified shareholder or a specified beneficiary (as those terms are defined in subsection 18(5)) of the taxpayer, or of any eligible group entity in respect of the taxpayer, that is not resident in Canada”. A specified shareholder under s.18(5) is a holder of 25% or more of the votes, or of shares with 25% or more of the fair market value. A 26% non-resident co-investor is one, and its presence is tested at group level: it disqualifies every entity in the group, not just the one it holds shares in.

The outcome

Nothing could be done inside the year. The $970,000 was denied. Section 18.2(2)'s own formula refers, in the description of D, to amounts “deductible under paragraph 111(1)(a.1) for the year”, which is the route by which restricted interest and financing expense is deducted in another year — so the amount is not necessarily lost permanently, though realising it depends on later capacity that this file does not model.

Prospectively the group did two things. It restructured the co-investor's holding below the 25% specified-shareholder threshold, which restores branch (c) if the other conditions hold. And it rebuilt the acquisition model to run the limitation as a line item off adjusted taxable income, so that the fourth acquisition was priced on after-limitation cash flow.

What it would have cost otherwise

The damage was already done at the pricing stage rather than at the filing. A model that deducts $3,400,000 of interest when $970,000 will be denied overstates after-tax free cash flow, and an acquisition price built on that overstatement is too high by the capitalised value of the error. The limitation was not a tax-return surprise; it was a valuation error discovered late.

The tell

The tell was in the capitalisation table, not the credit agreement. The equity stack changed and the debt did not, and the rule is triggered by the equity stack. Any group whose taxable capital is approaching $50,000,000, whose net interest cost is approaching $1,000,000, or that is about to admit a non-resident holder near 25%, is one transaction away from a limitation that no covenant measures.

Takeaways

  • • s.18.2(2) operates notwithstanding any other provision of the Act. Satisfying s.20(1)(c) is not an answer to it.
  • • It denies a proportion of interest and financing expenses, computed off adjusted taxable income — it does not cap a facility. A debt-to-EBITDA covenant does not measure it.
  • • The ratio of permissible expenses is 30% for taxation years beginning on or after January 1, 2024, and 40% for years beginning on or after October 1, 2023 and before that date.
  • • Excluded-entity status has three disjunctive branches and is tested every year at group level: the CCPC/$50,000,000 taxable-capital branch, the $1,000,000 net-expense de minimis, and the all-Canadian branch.
  • • One non-resident holder at 25% or more — a specified shareholder as defined in s.18(5) — closes the all-Canadian branch for the entire group.
  • • Model the limitation before pricing, not at filing. This is a valuation input, not a compliance line.

Sources

  • • Income Tax Act s.18.2 — marginal note to (2) Excessive interest and financing expenses limitation; the formula and its components; the definitions of ratio of permissible expenses and excluded entity in s.18.2(1), including branch (c)(iii). Fetched and quoted verbatim.
  • • Income Tax Act s.125(5.1) — marginal note Business limit reduction; the amount determined for C is taxable capital employed in Canada, aggregated across associated corporations where the corporation is associated.
  • • Income Tax Act s.18(5) — the definition of specified shareholder (25% of votes or of fair market value) imported into the excluded-entity test.
  • • Treadstone Law — loan covenants in acquisition financing — how leverage is limited by agreement. Adjacent, and the contrast is the point: covenants measure debt against earnings, the limitation measures deductibility against earnings, and clearing one says nothing about the other.
  • • The arithmetic above is worked from the statutory formula on illustrative inputs. The inputs are not from a published source; the formula, the 30% ratio and the three excluded-entity branches are.
  • • Whether the $970,000 is recovered in a later year depends on capacity rules this file does not model. The reference to paragraph 111(1)(a.1) is taken from the description of D in s.18.2(2) itself; that paragraph was not separately fetched.

See where AI pays off first in your business.

A 30-minute call is enough to tell you whether AI pays for itself here.

The Canadian benchmark

What do businesses like this one actually sell for?

Canadian small-business transaction data is not published anywhere, so most valuations in this country quote an American benchmark. The Deavo–Treadstone Acquisition Index is a daily record of Canadian listings built to replace that: asking-price distributions by province and city are published now, and days on market, departure rates and asking-to-sale spreads follow as the series lengthens. Leave an email and we will tell you as each measure lands.

No pitch, no listings. One email when the first report lands.