Treadstone Associates
Case File · Dispute Resolution

The accountant's working-capital number looked wrong, and the court would not review it the way an arbitration award gets reviewed

Anonymised, illustrative composite. An asset purchase agreement for a machine shop sent a working-capital dispute to an independent accounting firm for a final and binding determination. Both sides had been calling it 'the arbitration clause' for months. It was not one.

Treadstone Associates · Updated 2026

At a glance

  • • Ontario asset purchase, specialty machine shop; post-closing purchase-price adjustment referring any working-capital disagreement to an independent accounting firm, whose “determination shall be final and binding.”
  • • LOI target working capital: $650,000. Buyer's closing statement: $505,000. Seller's position: $600,000. The independent accountant's determination: $560,000 — a number neither side had proposed.
  • • Buyer applied to court arguing the accountant had averaged two inconsistent inventory methodologies rather than applying the FIFO policy the agreement specified.
  • • Whether that application could even be heard turned on characterisation: was this clause an arbitration (governed by the Arbitration Act, 1991) or an expert determination (governed only by the contract and the common law)?
  • • No statute defines “expert determination” or distinguishes it from arbitration. The line is drawn by what the parties' agreement actually asked the accountant to do.

The situation

An asset purchase agreement for a specialty machine shop included the standard mechanism for resolving a post-closing working-capital dispute: the buyer would prepare a closing statement, the seller could object, and if the two sides could not agree, the disagreement would be “referred to an independent accounting firm, mutually agreed or appointed by the ICAO, whose determination of the disputed items shall be final and binding on the parties.” No hearing was specified. No provision addressed submissions, evidence, or reasons. Both legal teams had referred to this, informally and repeatedly through negotiation, as “the arbitration clause.”

The problem

The buyer's closing statement of working capital came in at $505,000, well below the $650,000 target set in the letter of intent. The seller objected, proposing $600,000. Unable to agree, the parties appointed an independent accounting firm under the clause, which determined working capital at $560,000 — a figure neither side had proposed, and one the buyer believed rested on an error: the firm appeared to have averaged two inconsistent inventory-valuation methodologies rather than applying the FIFO policy the purchase agreement's accounting schedule specifically required.

The buyer applied to the Superior Court of Justice to set aside or vary the determination. Before the court could reach the merits of that argument, it had to decide what kind of process had actually produced the number.

The numbers

LOI target: $650,000. Buyer's proposed closing figure: $505,000 (a $145,000 shortfall in the buyer's favour). Seller's proposed figure: $600,000. The accountant's determination: $560,000. The gap the buyer was contesting — between $560,000 and what a correctly-applied FIFO methodology would have produced — was the entire dispute.

The rule that decided it

No statute defines “expert determination” or draws the line between it and arbitration. The distinction is a matter of contract interpretation and common law, and it turns on what the parties actually asked the decision-maker to do: submit rival cases to an adversarial, evidence-based process resulting in a reasoned decision — arbitration, governed by the Arbitration Act, 1991 — or rely on the decision-maker's own expertise and investigation to reach a figure, with no hearing and no obligation to give reasons — expert determination, governed only by the parties' contract and reviewable at common law on narrow grounds.

The Arbitration Act itself supplies the contrast, by showing what machinery an arbitration carries that this clause never mentioned. s.7(1) gives a party to an arbitration agreement the right to a mandatory stay of a competing court proceeding: “If a party to an arbitration agreement commences a proceeding in respect of a matter to be submitted to arbitration under the agreement, the court...shall, on the motion of another party to the arbitration agreement, stay the proceeding.” s.45(1) then gives a leave-based appeal on a question of law where the arbitration agreement is silent on appeals. Both provisions presuppose an arbitration agreement exists. Neither had anything to attach to here, because the clause never described a hearing, never provided for submissions or evidence from either side, and never required the accountant to give reasons — it asked for a number, from an expert, based on the expert's own review of the books. That is the shape of an expert determination, not an arbitration, regardless of what both legal teams had been calling it.

The consequence of that characterisation is not that the determination becomes unreviewable — it is that it is reviewable on a different, narrower common-law standard: a court will interfere with an expert determination only for fraud, collusion, or a departure from the mandate the parties actually gave the expert — not simply because the expert may have gotten the accounting wrong on the merits. “Wrong” and “outside the mandate” are different questions, and only the second one is reviewable.

The outcome

The court held the clause was an expert determination, not an arbitration — so the Arbitration Act's stay provision was never engaged, and the buyer's application was properly before the court on that threshold point. But the scope of review that followed was narrow: the court found the accountant had used a debatable but genuinely available methodology within the accounting firm's professional judgment, not a departure from the FIFO instruction so clear as to fall outside the mandate the parties had actually given. The $560,000 figure stood.

The buyer had been right that a court could hear the challenge. It had not appreciated how little the court could actually do with it once it did.

What it would have cost otherwise

Had this same clause instead been drafted — or found — to be an arbitration, the buyer would have had access to s.45's leave-based appeal on a question of law, arguably a marginally better fit for an accounting-methodology dispute than the near-unreviewable manifest-error standard that actually applied. The two regimes are not simply the same process under different names; on these facts, the buyer might well have preferred the one it did not get.

The tell

The tell was informal, and it was everywhere: both legal teams called this “the arbitration clause” throughout the negotiation, in emails, in markups, in the closing checklist. The document itself never used the word “arbitration,” never referenced the Arbitration Act, and provided no procedure for a hearing — all the hallmarks of expert determination sitting in plain sight under a label nobody had checked against the text.

Takeaways

  • • No statute defines expert determination or distinguishes it from arbitration — the label the parties use in conversation does not control; what the clause actually provides for does.
  • • A clause with no hearing, no submissions procedure and no requirement for reasons describes an expert determination, not an arbitration, however it is informally described.
  • • Expert determination is reviewable at common law only for fraud, collusion, or a departure from the expert's mandate — not simply because the outcome looks wrong on the merits.
  • • Arbitration and expert determination are not interchangeable labels for the same protection — the review standard, and the appeal rights, genuinely differ between them.

Sources

  • • Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17 — s.7(1) (mandatory stay of court proceedings, engaged only where an arbitration agreement exists) and s.45(1) (leave-based appeal on a question of law, likewise dependent on the process being an arbitration).
  • • No statute defines “expert determination” or the line between it and arbitration. That characterisation is a matter of contract interpretation and common law, turning on whether the clause describes an adversarial, evidence-based process or reliance on the expert's own investigation and judgment.
  • • Treadstone Law — what happens when neither side agrees on an escrow or holdback dispute in Ontario — on the practical dispute mechanics; it does not walk through the arbitration/expert-determination characterisation, which is the operative point here.

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